A public-private partnership is, at its core, a long-term agreement about who carries which risks. Tariffs, payment mechanisms, performance standards and the price itself all follow from that allocation. When a partnership runs into trouble, the cause can usually be traced back to a risk that was placed with the wrong party, priced unrealistically, or never addressed at all.
Nigeria has a well-established framework for PPPs. At federal level it rests on the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC) Act 2005 and the National Policy on Public Private Partnership, and several states have passed their own PPP laws and set up dedicated PPP units. That framework sets out how projects are identified, approved and procured. It cannot make the commercial choices for each project. Those choices, above all the allocation of risk, decide whether a partnership delivers what was promised.
This article is for officials in ministries, departments, agencies and PPP units, and for the advisers and investors who work with them. It explains the principles of risk allocation, looks in detail at the risks that most often strain Nigerian partnerships, and sets out the contract provisions and preparation work that help partnerships hold.
What a PPP is, and what it is not
A PPP is a long-term contract in which a private partner takes on significant responsibility for designing, building, financing, operating or maintaining a public asset or service, and is paid in a way that is linked to its performance. The private partner's money, as well as its reputation, is at stake.
PPPs come in several forms. In a concession, the private partner typically builds or upgrades an asset and recovers its investment from user charges, such as tolls or fares. In an availability-payment PPP, sometimes described as design, build, finance and operate, the government pays the private partner regular amounts for making an asset available to a defined standard, and keeps the risk of how much it is used. Lease and management contracts involve less private investment and transfer less risk.
What a PPP is not is a way to get infrastructure for free. Every PPP is ultimately paid for by users, by taxpayers, or by both. Its value lies in transferring the right risks to a partner that can manage them better, and in the discipline of whole-life costing and performance-based payment. If those benefits are absent, a conventionally procured project may offer better value.
The principle of risk allocation
The standard rule is that each risk should sit with the party best able to manage it or, where no one can control it, with the party best able to absorb it at the lowest cost.
A private contractor is usually best placed to manage the cost and timing of construction, the reliability of equipment and the efficiency of operations. A government is usually best placed to manage the risks of changing its own laws and policies, securing land and rights of way, and delivering approvals within its control. Some risks, such as natural disasters, cannot be controlled by either party and are often shared.
Why the principle is hard to apply
The principle is easy to state and hard to apply, for four reasons.
- Transferring risk is not free. A private partner that takes on a risk will price it. Pushing too much risk onto the private side raises the cost of the project, or attracts bidders who have underpriced the risk and will later seek to renegotiate.
- Some risks are shared by nature. Traffic on a toll road depends partly on the operator's service and partly on government decisions about competing routes, fuel prices and the wider economy. No clean allocation exists.
- Lenders shape the outcome. Most PPPs are financed largely with debt. Lenders will only accept a risk allocation that leaves the project able to repay them in foreseeable scenarios, so their requirements often set the limits of what the private partner can accept.
- Contracts outlive governments. A concession of 20 or 30 years will run across several administrations. Its risk allocation has to remain acceptable to people who did not negotiate it and may not have supported it.
The risk matrix
The practical tool for allocation is the risk matrix: a table listing every significant risk, a description of it, its likely impact, who carries it, and how it is mitigated. A good risk matrix is prepared during the business case, tested with potential bidders, and then reflected clause by clause in the contract. A common problem is a risk matrix that says one thing and a contract that says another, because they were drafted by different people at different times.
The risks that most often strain Nigerian partnerships
The risks below are not unique to Nigeria, but each has features in the Nigerian context that deserve particular attention.
Demand and revenue risk
User-pays projects such as toll roads, bus systems, markets and car parks depend on forecasts of usage and tariffs. Forecasts are often optimistic, sometimes because they are prepared to support a project that has already been decided on. When actual demand falls short, or tariffs become politically contentious, the private partner's revenue falls and pressure builds for a bailout or renegotiation.
There are several ways to manage this risk:
- Independent, conservative forecasting, with sensitivity tests that show what happens if demand is significantly lower than expected.
- Availability payments, where the government pays for a service that meets defined standards and keeps the demand risk itself. This is often more robust where demand is genuinely uncertain. It is not cheaper. It turns the project into a long-term budget commitment that must be planned for and honoured.
- Revenue-sharing bands, where the government shares in revenue above a certain level and provides limited support below a floor.
- Minimum revenue guarantees, which reduce the private partner's risk but create a contingent liability for the government. They should be used sparingly, sized carefully and recorded.
Foreign exchange risk
Many infrastructure projects borrow in foreign currency to pay for imported equipment, then earn their revenue in naira. The naira's sharp depreciation after the 2023 exchange-rate reforms showed how quickly that mismatch can make a viable project unviable. Debt service rises in naira terms overnight, while tariffs and payments fixed in naira do not.
The options include:
- Local-currency financing where it is available, including bonds supported by local-currency guarantee providers such as InfraCredit.
- Partial indexation, where part of the tariff or availability payment is adjusted for movements in the exchange rate.
- Shared mechanisms, where the private partner absorbs exchange-rate movements within an agreed band and the government absorbs movements beyond it.
- Reducing foreign-currency costs by sourcing more equipment and services locally where quality and cost allow.
Each option shifts cost to users, to the budget or to the private partner's returns. The important point is that the choice should be made explicitly at the outset, priced by bidders and understood by the government, rather than left to emerge in a crisis.
Tariff adjustment risk
A contract may allow tariffs to rise with inflation, but if every increase needs fresh political approval, the formula offers little comfort to investors. Experience in many countries shows that politically sensitive tariff increases are often delayed or refused, particularly before elections.
Clear indexation rules, a defined approval process with time limits, and a stated remedy if an agreed adjustment is withheld all help. The remedy might be compensation from the budget, an extension of the concession period, or a right to terminate with defined compensation. Early, honest public communication about how tariffs will change over the life of the contract also reduces the political cost of each increase.
Change in law and political risk
Private partners will rarely accept the risk of the government changing the rules in a way that targets their project. Contracts commonly distinguish between:
- general changes in law, which affect all businesses and which the private partner is expected to bear, and
- discriminatory or project-specific changes, which single out the project, the sector or PPP companies, and for which the private partner is compensated.
In a federal system, it also matters whose actions are covered. A state concession can be affected by federal decisions on fuel prices, tax, import duties or regulation, and federal projects can be affected by state decisions on land, levies or permits. A contract signed by one level of government cannot bind the other, so the allocation needs to be realistic about what the contracting authority actually controls.
Political risk more broadly, including expropriation and breach of contract by the public side, is often addressed through termination compensation and, for larger projects, through political risk insurance or guarantees from development finance institutions.
Land, permits and right of way
Delays in acquiring land, resettling occupants, relocating utilities or obtaining permits are among the most common causes of cost overruns and disputes. These are usually government responsibilities, and the contract should say clearly what happens if they are late, typically through relief or compensation events.
The most effective mitigation is to start early. Land acquisition and resettlement should begin well before procurement, in line with national law and with the environmental and social standards that lenders apply, which may be more demanding. A project that goes to tender before it has secured its land is transferring a risk to bidders that they cannot manage, and they will price it accordingly.
Construction and performance risk
These risks belong largely with the private partner, and the contract should make that transfer real. That means fixed-price, date-certain construction obligations, measurable performance standards, payment deductions for poor availability or service, and independent monitoring.
A risk transfer that the authority never enforces is no transfer at all. Authorities need the capacity to monitor performance throughout the life of the contract, not just during procurement. Contract management is often under-resourced, and the result is that deductions are not applied, standards slip and the private partner's incentives weaken.
An illustrative example
The following is a hypothetical example, not a description of any real project. A state government wants to build and operate a network of bus depots and terminals to support a new public bus service. Its first draft risk allocation puts almost everything on the private partner: construction, operation, maintenance, ridership, fares, foreign exchange and land.
Market sounding shows that bidders will price the ridership, fare and land risks very heavily, or decline to bid. The state revises the structure:
- Construction, maintenance and facility operation stay with the private partner, paid through availability payments linked to performance standards for cleanliness, safety and opening hours.
- Ridership and fare revenue stay with the state, which sets fares as part of its transport policy.
- Land is acquired by the state before the tender, with resettlement completed to lender standards.
- Foreign exchange is shared: the private partner raises as much local-currency finance as it can, and a portion of the availability payment is indexed to the exchange rate within an agreed band.
- Change in law that specifically affects the bus depots or the PPP company is compensated. General changes are not.
The revised structure costs the state more in direct commitments, but it attracts more bidders, reduces the price of the private partner's services, and is far less likely to collapse into renegotiation.
Provisions that help contracts hold
Beyond the headline allocation, a handful of provisions do much of the work when circumstances change.
Termination and compensation. The contract should state what is paid on termination for each cause: private partner default, authority default, prolonged force majeure, or voluntary termination by the authority. Lenders study these clauses closely because they determine whether debt is repaid. Authorities should study them just as closely, because they define the government's maximum exposure.
Lender step-in rights. Direct agreements between the authority and the lenders let the lenders step in and rescue a failing project, for example by replacing the operator, before the authority terminates. This protects the public service as well as the lenders.
Relief and compensation events. Defined lists of events that give the private partner more time, or more time and money, reduce arguments about who caused a delay. Relief events might include extreme weather. Compensation events typically include authority delays and breaches.
Refinancing gains. If the private partner refinances on better terms once the project is operating and construction risk has passed, a share of the gain is commonly returned to the authority.
Handback requirements. The contract should specify the condition in which assets must be returned at the end of the term, with inspections and retention mechanisms in the final years, so the authority does not inherit a run-down asset.
Tiered dispute resolution. Escalation from project managers to senior officials, then expert determination for technical questions, with arbitration as the last resort. The Arbitration and Mediation Act 2023 modernised Nigeria's arbitration law and placed mediation on a statutory footing, which makes a tiered approach more practical. The choice of governing law, seat and rules of arbitration should be made deliberately, with an eye to enforceability and cost.
Getting the process right
Good risk allocation comes out of good preparation. The federal process, administered by the ICRC, requires projects to pass through an outline business case and a full business case, each assessed for compliance before approval. State processes vary but follow similar logic. These stages are most valuable when treated as genuine decision points rather than formalities.
Before going to market, an authority should be able to show:
- a feasibility study and a value-for-money assessment comparing the PPP with conventional procurement
- a clear view of the fiscal commitments and contingent liabilities the project creates
- land, permits and approvals secured or on a credible timetable
- a draft contract with a risk matrix that has been tested with potential bidders
Market sounding
Market sounding before the tender is especially valuable. Structured conversations with potential bidders and lenders reveal which risks they will not take at any sensible price, what information they need, and what would make the project more competitive. It is far better to learn this while there is still time to change the structure than after a failed procurement.
Fiscal commitments and contingent liabilities
Availability payments are firm commitments that will appear in budgets for decades. Guarantees, minimum revenue commitments and termination payments are contingent: they may never be paid, but they are real obligations. Both need to be recorded, monitored and considered in the government's wider debt and budget planning, consistent with the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 and the relevant state laws. Doing so protects the public purse and makes the government's commitments more credible to investors.
Questions for an authority considering a PPP
- Is a PPP the right delivery route for this project, and how do we know?
- Who carries demand risk, and is that the right party for this project?
- How will the project cope with a large movement in the exchange rate?
- What would the government owe, and when, under each termination scenario?
- Which land, approvals and permits must we still deliver, and by when?
- Has the draft risk allocation been tested with the market?
- Do we have the people and budget to manage this contract for its whole life?
Five Rivers Consulting brings PPP advisory together with commercial law and arbitration expertise, so the commercial, financial and legal questions are worked through as one. Talk to us about a project.
